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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW, TEST FOR CAUSATION, AND ALLOCATION OF
BURDENS OF PROOF IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE CASES ESTABLISHED
In Wallace v. Milliken & Co.1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
established the standard of review, test for causation, and allocation of
burdens of proof in workers' compensation retaliatory discharge cases.
Milliken & Company (Milliken) hired Jimmy Wallace as a ma-
chine operator on July 22, 1986. Wallace severely injured his hand on
September 10, 1986, while operating an industrial machine. A workers'
compensation claim was filed, and Wallace received temporary total
and permanent disability benefits. After being hospitalized and under-
going several operations, Wallace returned to work on December 9,
1986. Milliken discharged him that same day.
2
Wallace sued Milliken under section 41-1-80 of the South Carolina
Code,3 which prohibits employer retaliation against employees that in-
stitute or participate in workers' compensation proceedings. 4 Wallace
alleged that Milliken discharged him because of his workers' compen-
sation claim.5 Milliken countered that it fired Wallace because he vio-
lated safety rules.6 The trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded Wal-
lace $12,500.69 in back wages and ordered reinstatement.7 The South
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.8 Milliken appealed.
The supreme court first addressed whether a retaliatory discharge
action is one at law or in equity. The court recognized that under sec-
tion 41-1-80 a wrongfully discharged employee is entitled only to lost
wages and reinstatement.9 The court determined that these forms of
1. 406 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1991), affg as modified, 300 S.C. 553, 389 S.E.2d 448 (Ct.
App. 1990).
2. Id. at 359.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
4. Section 41-1-80 provides in pertinent part, "No employer may discharge or de-
mote any employee because the employee has instituted or caused to be instituted, in
good faith, any proceeding under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law (Title
42 of the 1976 Code), or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding." Id.
5. Wallace, 406 S.E.2d at 359.
6. Id. at 360.
7. Id. at 359.
8. Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C. 553, 389 S.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd as
modified, 406 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1991).
9. Wallace, 406 S.E.2d at 359. Sectiori 41-1-80 states in pertinent part, "Any em-
1
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relief are equitable remedies.10 Therefore, the court concluded that a
cause of action arising under section 41-1-80 is equitable in nature.1
Because the case involved an equitable action tried by a judge without
a jury, the appellate courts had jurisdiction to find facts in accordance
with their own views of the preponderance of the evidence.
2
The supreme court next determined the appropriate test for cau-
sation in retaliatory discharge cases. The court of appeals held that to
prevail in a retaliatory discharge action brought under section 41-1-80,
the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
filing of the workers' compensation claim was a substantial factor in
bringing about the discharge."3 The supreme court decided that the
substantial factor test is inappropriate for this cause of action and
adopted the determinative factor causation test. 4 The determinative
factor test requires the employee to establish that the discharge would
not have occurred "but for" the filing of the workers' compensation
claim.1
5
Finally, the supreme court considered the allocation of burdens of
proof in retaliatory discharge cases. Section 41-1-80 gives employers
certain affirmative defenses to retaliation claims.' 6 One such defense is
the violation of a specific written company policy. Milliken raised this
defense and alleged that Wallace violated a company rule by placing
ployer who violates any provision of this section is liable in a civil action for lost wages
suffered by an employee as a result of the violation, and an employee discharged or de-
moted in violation of this section is entitled to be reinstated to his former position." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 41-1-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
10. Wallace, 406 S.E.2d at 359.
11. Id.; see also Wallace, 300 S.C. at 555, 389 S.E.2d at 449 ("An action created by
statute is generally considered a law action unless the statute provides otherwise or the
nature of the relief permitted by the statute is clearly equitable.") (citing 1A C.J.S. Ac-
tions § 126, at 539 (1985)).
12. Kelly v. Peeples, 294 S.C. 63, 362 S.E.2d 636 (1987) (per curiam); see Wallace,
406 S.E.2d at 359 (citing Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221
S.E.2d 773 (1976)).
13. Wallace, 300 S.C. at 557, 389 S.E.2d at 450.
14. Wallace, 406 S.E.2d at 360.
15. Id. The determinative factor test places a more stringent burden oh the em-
ployee than does the substantial factor test. Id. Although the supreme court rejected the
court of appeals use of the substantial factor test, it affirmed the result and found that
Wallace had established retaliation even under the determinative factor test. Id. at 361.
16. Section 41-1-80 provides in pertinent part:
Any employer shall have as an affirmative defense to this section the fol-
lowing. wilful or habitual tardiness or absence from work; being disorderly or
intoxicated while at work; destruction of any of the employer's property; fail-
ure to meet established employer work standards; malingering; embezzlement
or larceny of the employer's property; violating specific written company policy
for which the action is a stated remedy of the violation.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
1991]
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his hands in an operating machine. The supreme court agreed with the
court of appeals and the trial court and held that Milliken failed to
prove this affirmative defense. 17 The supreme court disagreed, however,
with that part of the court of appeals decision which held that Milliken
was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Wallace
was discharged for violating a safety rule.18
The supreme court concluded that the court of appeals decision
implied that the employer had the burden of justifying the discharge. 9
The supreme court stated that requiring Milliken to prove it dis-
charged Wallace for a company policy violation "effectively shifted the
burden to [Milliken] to disprove that the discharge was in retaliation
for filing the claim. '2° The court decided that this requirement was
improper. The court established that even though the employer has
the burden of proving affirmative defenses, the ultimate burden of per-
suasion remains at all times with the employee.2
The supreme court's decision in Wallace establishes that actions
arising under section 41-1-80 are equitable in nature; that the determi-
native factor test, which requires the employee to establish that he or
she would not have been discharged "but for" the filing of the workers'
compensation claim, is the appropriate test of causation; and that the
burden of persuasion remains at all times with the employee even
though the employer has the burden of proving any statutory affirma-
tive defense pleaded.
Stephen Coe
II. RECOVERY FOR SUCCESSIVE PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY TO
THE SAME BODY PART NOT ALLOWED
In Medlin v. Greenville County22 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that when a claimant suffers a permanent and total disabil-
ity and recovers compensation for the injury, the claimant is precluded
from collecting an additional permanent and total disability award for
a successive injury to the same body part under the scheduled loss pro-
17. Wallace, 406 S.E.2d at 360.




21. Id. Again, this modification of the court of appeals decision did not affect the
result in the case. The supreme court concluded that the record supported the finding
that the reason Milliken offered for firing Wallace was a pretext. Id. at 360.
22. 401 S.E.2d 667 (S.C. 1991).
(Vol. 43
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visions of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law.23 The su-
preme court modified the court of appeals decision 2 and overruled im-
portant dicta from an earlier court of appeals case.25
In 1983 James Medlin suffered a back injury while employed by
Greenville County. The hearing commissioner awarded benefits for to-
tal and permanent disability.26 The employer settled the claim for
$60,000 during the pendency of the appeal. The commissioner ap-
proved the settlement. The claimant reinjured his back in 1985. The
single commissioner, citing the award from 1983, denied benefits for
permanent and total disability. The review panel reversed the single
commissioner's decision and awarded benefits for total and permanent
disability. The circuit court affirmed the review panel's award. The
court of appeals reversed.
27
The court of appeals focused its analysis on section 42-9-17028 and
interpreted the section to be a lifetime limitation on recovery while in
the same employment. 29 The supreme court reached its result by hold-
ing that section 42-9-170 does not apply to the case.3" The supreme
court stated that section 42-9-170 only applies to cases in which an
employee is receiving payments for a previous disability when benefits
are awarded for the subsequent injury.3' The court further found that
the facts of Medlin are indistinguishable from the facts of Hopper v.
Firestone Stores32 and that no section of the Workers' Compensation
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990).
24. Medlin v. Greenville County, 301 S.C. 411, 392 S.E.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1990), af'd
as modified, 401 S.E.2d 667 (S.C. 1991).
25. Wyndham v. R.A. & E.M. Thornley & Co., 291 S.C. 496, 354 S.E.2d 399 (Ct.
App. 1987).
26. Under section 42-9-30(19) a back injury that results in a fifty-percent or greater
loss of use entitles the claimant to a finding of total and permanent disability. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 42-9-30(19) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 42-9-10 provides for up to five hundred
weeks of compensation for such a disability. Id. § 42-9-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
27. Medlin, 301 S.C. at 412, 392 S.E.2d at 193.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section provides:
If an employee receives a permanent injury as specified in § 42-9-30 or the
second paragraph of § 42-9-10 after having sustained another permanent injury
in the same employment, he shall be entitled to compensation for both inju-
ries, but the total compensation shall be paid by extending the period and not
by increasing the amount of weekly compensation, and in no case exceeding
five hundred weeks.
Id.
29. Medlin, 301 S.C. at 413, 392 S.E.2d at 194.
30. Medlin v. Greenville County, 401 S.E.2d 667, 668 (S.C. 1991).
31. Id.
32. 222 S.C. 143, 72 S.E.2d 71 (1952). In Hopper the claimant was injured in a non-
work-related motorcycle accident prior to being employed. The accident resulted in the
amputation of a leg. The claimant suffered a subsequent work-related injury to the re-
maining stub. The supreme court granted the claimant temporary total compensation
1991]
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Law provides the relief sought by Medlin.3 3 Consistent with Hopper
the court found that "[Medlin] is not entitled to any further benefits
for loss of use to the same body part as the loss of use to his back has
already been fully 'written-off,' and is non-existent in so far as the Act
is concerned."
'34
The Medlin court's holding avoided two major inequities that re-
sult from the court of appeals construction of section 42-9-170. First,
by focusing on the totality of the injury as opposed to the permanence
of the injury, the court avoided a myriad of anomalous results possible
under the court of appeals rationale.35 Second, the court avoided an
irrational classification scheme36 first set forth in dicta in Wyndham v.
R.A. & E.M. Thornley & Co.3 7 and followed by the court of appeals in
Medlin.
The Wyndham court held that a limitation on the recovery of ben-
efits under the Second Injury Fund provisions3s does not exist when a
and medical benefits, but denied him permanent benefits. The supreme court held that
the claimant was not entitled to an award for permanent benefits because the subse-
quent injury did not cause any serious disfigurement in excess of what existed prior to
the subsequent injury. Id. at 151, 72 S.E.2d at 74.
33. Medlin, 401 S.E.2d at 668-69,
34. Id. at 669.
35. For example, in his dissent in the court of appeals decision, Judge Gardner
pointed out that a permanent injury could be followed by a partial and nonpermanent
injury, compensable under section 42-9-20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
In such a case the claimant would receive the 500 weeks of compensation for the first
injury and then receive 340 weeks for the subsequent injury. On the other hand, if the
second injury is permanent, the claimant would recover nothing for the second injury
under the court of appeals interpretation of section 42-9-170. "This is illogical and to
thus interpret Section 42-9-170 requires an absurd result." Medlin v. Greenville County,
301 S.C. 411, 416, 392 S.E.2d 192, 195 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd as modified, 401 S.E.2d 667
(S.C. 1991).
36. The classification under section 42-9-170 is based upon whether the claimant
changed employers between the successive injuries. For the only known example of a
case that upheld this type of classification, see Corbitt v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 256 Ark.
932, 511 S.W.2d 184 (1974) (classification that allows separate recovery for claimants
who change employers between injuries but denies recovery for those who remain with
the same employer is rationally related to state's interest in encouraging employers to
retain injured employees).
37. 291 S.C. 496, 354 S.E.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1987).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-2-400 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990). The Wyndham
court stated, "One of the purposes behind establishing the Second Injury fund was to
encourage employers to hire handicapped persons by providing reimbursement to the
employer or insurer for compensation paid as a result of a second injury." 291 S.C. at
499, 354 S.E.2d at 401 (citing Boone's Masonry Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Second
Injury Fund, 267 S.C. 277, 227 S.E.2d 659 (1976)). "The fund was designed to compen-
sate handicapped workers fully for their subsequent injuries without penalizing employ-
ers for having them in the first place." Id. at 500, 354 S.E.2d at 401 (citing Custy, The
Second Injury Fund: Encouraging Employment of the Handicapped Worker in South
[Vol. 43
5
et al.: Workers' Compensation Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
claimant changes employers between successive compensable claims.3 9
In support of its view that the legislature did not impose a limitation
on the claimant's ability to recover, the Wyndham court stated, "When
the legislature wished to impose a 500 week limit on successive injuries
it did so explicitly."' 0 The court then cited section 42-9-170 as an ex-
ample and noted that the section "limit[s] to 500 weeks the total com-
pensation available for successive permanent injuries sustained in the
same employment.' 1 The court of appeals in Medlin relied in part on
this language to hold that section 42-9-170 limits the claimant to five
hundred weeks compensation. 2
The establishment of the Second Injury Fund did not confer, how-
ever, additional substantive rights upon claimants. Instead, the Second
Injury Fund is a procedural source of reimbursement for the employer
that hires the previously injured claimant. Therefore, the supreme
court wisely avoided a tap dance around the Wyndham dicta and held,
"To the extent that Wyndham . . . distinguishes between successive
injuries incurred while working for the same rather than for different
employers, it is overruled."'
The supreme court's holding also eliminates the greatest danger of
the court of appeals decision. Under the court of appeals rationale, em-
ployees that suffer a total disability are well advised to change employ-
ers. Only by changing employers after suffering a total and permanent
injury, could employees become eligible for future compensation. This
is not in the best interest of either the employer or the employee. Stat-
utorily encouraged turnover not only would disrupt the workplace, but
also may force an injured employee to accept alternative employment
on less desirable terms. Under the supreme court's interpretation, this
turnover is neither encouraged nor rewarded.
Carolina, 27 S.C.L. REv. 661, 662 (1976)).
39. Wyndham, 291 S.C. at 500, 354 S.E.2d at 402.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Medlin v. Greenville County, 301 S.C. 411, 413, 392 S.E.2d 192, 194 (Ct. App.
1990), aff'd as modified, 401 S.E.2d 667 (S.C. 1991). The court of appeals also attempted
to distinguish Wyndham factually. It asserted that there is a legislatively intended "dis-
tinction between employees who incur a partial disability followed by a permanent total
disability versus those who incur successive permanent total disabilities." Id. at 413, 392
S.E.2d at 194. The difficulty with the assertion is that neither the Wyndham dicta nor
section 42-9-170 require that the prior or subsequent injuries be total in nature. They
only require that both disabilities be permanent. The court of appeals reasoning failed to
recognize that section 42-9-170 also applies to partial disabilities as long as they are
permanent and are preceded or followed by another permanent injury. Likewise, section
42-9-170 would apply to successive permanent disabilities whether or not either is a total
disability.
43. Medlin v. Greenville County, 401 S.E.2d 667, 669 (S.C. 1991).
1991]
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One classification created by the supreme court's interpretation of
section 42-9-170 warrants examination. The court correctly pointed out
that section 42-9-170 only "sets forth the amount of compensation an
employee can receive while he is at the same time drawing compensa-
tion for a previous disability in the same employment. '" The claimant
in Medlin received a lump sum settlement and thus "was not drawing
compensation for [the prior] injury at the time his second injury oc-
curred."4 ' Although claimants now cannot recover twice for total per-
manent disability, claimants remain eligible for temporary benefits.
Because section 42-9-170 limits the recovery to five hundred weeks of
compensation when the payment periods for the permanent injury
overlap, claimants that receive lump sum settlements may receive more
advantageous terms of recovery than do the claimants that receive pe-
riodic payments. Therefore, a colorable equal protection argument ex-
ists on behalf of claimants that receive periodic payments.
48
The supreme court's decision in Medlin resolved many potential
difficulties that could have resulted from the application of previous
decisions. The decision leads to a rational result regarding the applica-
tion of section 42-9-170 and repairs the anomalous results of the court
of appeals treatment of the Second Injury Fund cases.
Brian P. Murphy
III. DIscovERY RULE NOT APPLICABLE TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CLAIMS
In Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit47 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that the statute of limitations applicable to workers'
compensation claims48 barred a claimant from recovering for a knee
injury because she had not filed the claim within two years of the acci-
44. Id. at 668.
45. Id.
46. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("A classification 'must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.' ") (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
47. 400 S.E.2d 494 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1990). Section 42-15-40
stated in pertinent part that "[t]he right to compensation under this title shall be for-
ever barred unless a claim is filed with the commission within two years after an acci-
dent." Id. The 1990 amendment to section 42-15-40 substituted "is barred" for "shall be




et al.: Workers' Compensation Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
dent. The court expressly declined to apply the discovery rule49 to stay
the running of the statute of limitations in workers' compensation
cases.
50
On January 2, 1985, Virginia Gaynell Mauldin, an employee of
Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit (Jack Rabbit), injured her left knee when she
tripped on an uneven doorway of the film collection booth where she
worked. Mauldin immediately notified her supervisor of the accident.
The supervisor instructed Mauldin to seek immediate medical atten-
tion, and she went to the emergency room. The hospital physician on
duty diagnosed Mauldin's injury as a medial collateral strain. Despite
the injury, Mauldin continued to work without lost wages, and Jack
Rabbit paid her medical bills.51
The condition of Mauldin's knee improved. However, over the
next two years her knee, occasionally swelling and stiffening, continued
to be the source of chronic pain. Although she reported her continued
knee problem to her family physician and to her supervisor, Mauldin
received no further medical attention until November 1, 1987.52
On November 1, 1987, after her knee remained swollen, Mauldin
sought the advice of an orthopedic surgeon. After diagnosing the condi-
tion as a torn medial meniscus,5 the surgeon operated on the knee on
December 3, 1987. Mauldin returned to work a week later, and on De-
cember 30, 1987, over two years and eleven months after the accident,
she filed her claim for compensation with the Workers' Compensation
Commission."
Jack Rabbit asserted that the two-year statute of limitations
barred the claim because Mauldin's accident occurred over two years
prior to the filing of the claim. Nonetheless, a single commissioner, a
49. Under the discovery rule, the statute [of limitations] does not begin to run
from the date the negligent act or the breach of contract occurred; rather, the
statute runs from the date the injury resulting from the wrongful conduct ei-
ther is discovered or may be discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Dillon County School Dist. No. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 215,
332 S.E.2d 555, 559 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d 697 (1985), cert.
dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986) (citing Snell v. Columbia Gun Exch., Inc.,
276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981) (per curiam)); accord Wilson v. Shannon, 299 S.C.
512, 513, 386 S.E.2d 257, 258 (Ct. App. 1989).
50. Mauldin, 400 S.E.2d at 496.
51. Id. at 495.
52. Id.
53. Because Mauldin's injury is different than what a doctor originally diagnosed,
Mauldin could have argued that she did not "discover" this condition until November 1,
1987. However, the court determined that the discovery pertained to the knee injury and
"observ[ed] that if a 'discovery rule' were applied, the result would be the same" because
the date of injury and date of discovery are the same. Id. at 496.
54. Id. at 495.
1991]
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panel of the full commission, and a circuit court found the claim
timely. Jack Rabbit appealed. 55
The court of appeals characterized the issue as "whether the two
year limitation period of Section 42-15-40 runs from the date of the
accident or the date the employee discovers the injury."5 Although it
recognized that the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law57
should be liberally construed, 58 the Mauldin court stated that "the
courts are not at liberty by judicial construction to add to or amend its
provisions so as to excuse a claimant from complying with its
mandatory requirements." '59 The court found the limitation language
"plain and decisive" and held, therefore, that section 42-15-40 barred
Mauldin's claim.60
The Mauldin court noted that other parts of section 42-15-40 sup-
ported its decision not to apply the discovery rule to claims like
Mauldin's."1 Section 42-15-40 contains two provisions that do provide
for a delay in the running of the statute. First, if the injury results in
death, the two-year limitation period runs from the date of the death
regardless of the date of the accident. 2 Similarly, for recovery in occu-
pational disease cases, the statutory clock does not begin to tick until
the date the claimant receives notice of a definitive diagnosis of the
occupational disease.6 3 The court decided that these two exceptions
prove that the General Assembly intended that claimants must file
other workers' compensation claims under section 42-15-40 within two
years of the date of the accident, not within two years of the date the
claimant discovered the injury.
6 4
The court noted that even under the discovery rule, Mauldin could
not recover because she discovered her injury on the same day as the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to 42-19-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990).
58. Mauldin, 400 S.E.2d at 495 (citing Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C.
159, 64 S.E.2d 396 (1951); Fox v. Union-Buffalo Mills, 226 S.C. 561, 86 S.E.2d 253
(1955)).
59. Id. at 496.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (amended 1990).
63. Id. The 1990 amendment to section 42-15-40 added an additional exception:
"For the death or injury of a member of the South Carolina National Guard, as provided
for in Section 42-7-67, the time for filing a claim is two years after the accident or one
year after the federal claim is finalized, whichever is later." 1990 S.C. Acts 3314 (codified
as S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
64. Mauldin, 400 S.E.2d at 496 (stating that "exceptions made in a statute give rise
to a strong inference that no other exceptions were intended") (citing Pennsylvania Nat'l
Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 555, 320 S.E.2d 458, 463 (Ct. App. 1984)).
[Vol. 43
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accident.6 5 Therefore, even if the court had judicially expanded the
clear statutory language and applied the discovery rule, Mauldin
clearly was not the appropriate case in which to do it. However, if a
case presenting greater inequities emerges, the court may be tempted
to re-evaluate its position. 6
Professor Larson contends that "accident" statutes such as South
Carolina's are patently unfair when they bar recovery for injuries that
do not manifest themselves within the limitation period. 7 The latent
injury scenario makes a stronger case for application of the discovery
rule in workers' compensation cases for at least two reasons. First, the
exclusive remedy provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensa-
tion Law abolishes the claimant's common-law remedies. 66 Therefore,
if the claimant does not or cannot discover the injury until two years
after the accident, she cannot recover from the employer at all for her
injuries without estoppel or waiver theories. Second, the only way to
achieve the overall beneficent legislative intent underlying the Work-
ers' Compensation Law is to liberally apply the limitations period in
favor of the claimant.6 " However, the imposition of a limitation on ac-
tions is designed to alleviate the problems associated with claims that
become stale after a few years. Most jurisdictions hold that the former
interest trumps the latter.70
65. Id.
66. By changing the facts in Mauldin slightly, the argument in favor of the discov-
ery rule becomes somewhat stronger. For example, if Mauldin had suffered an appar-
ently insignificant bruise that subsequently matured into a torn medial meniscus after
the two year-period had expired, the court may have been less inclined to find against
her.
67. See 2B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION § 78.42(b), at 15-268
(1989). Professor Larson states:
It is odd indeed to find, in a supposedly beneficent piece of legislation, the
survival of this fragment of irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical
forfeitures of legal statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally pro-
ceed on the theory that a man forfeits his rights only when he inexcusably
delays assertion of them, and any number of excuses will toll the running of
the period. But here no amount of vigilance is of any help. The limitations
period runs against a claim that has not yet matured; and when it matures, it
is already barred.
Id.
68. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Hardee v. Bruce Johnson Trucking Co., 293 S.C. 349, 356, 360 S.E.2d
522, 526 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 14 S.E.2d 889
(1941)).
70. 2B A. LARSON, supra note 67, § 78.41(b), at 15-234. Professor Larson states:
[The great majority of the courts have been sufficiently impressed with the
acute unfairness of a literal application of this language [requiring the statute
to run immediately from the date of accident] to read in an implied condition
suspending the running of the statute until by reasonable care and diligence it
1991]
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Despite the equitable arguments in favor of the discovery rule, es-
pecially in latent injury cases, Mauldin clearly holds that South Caro-
lina does not apply the discovery rule in workers' compensation cases
that involve neither occupational diseases nor death benefits.
David A. Wilson
IV. EXCEPTION TO THE TRADITIONAL HEART ATTACK RULE FOR HEAT-
INDUCED HEART ATTACKS CREATED
In Holley v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.71 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a worker's heart attack caused by exposure
to extreme temperature in a place where the worker is required to be
and in the normal course of employment is compensable under the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law.7 2 In so holding, the court
created an exception to the traditional heart attack rule and enlarged
the category of excessive heat injuries compensable under South Caro-
lina Workers' Compensation Law to include heart attacks.
Prior to Holley South Carolina courts awarded workers' compen-
sation benefits for heart attacks only when "induced by unexpected
strain or overexertion in the performance of the duties of the employ-
ment or by unusual and extraordinary conditions in the employ-
ment."' "7 This is the traditional heart attack rule, and courts did not
consider excessive temperature in the normal course of employment to
be an unusual or extraordinary condition of employment.
is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained.
The number of jurisdictions that are still capable of destroying compensa-
tion rights for failure to file a claim at a time when its existence could not
reasonably have been known has dwindled to three or four at the most-all
under statutes dating the period from time [of] accident rather than time of
injury. The use of the "accident" rather than the "injury" as the starting point
for the limitations period has not been an insuperable obstacle to the judicial
achievement of the more humane rule ....
Id. at 15-234 to -235 (footnotes omitted). Oddly enough, Professor Larson cites South
Carolina as one of the seven "accident" jurisdictions that accept the discovery rule. Id. &
15-235 n.27. However, an analysis of the South Carolina cases Professor Larson cites, see
id. § 78.41(a), at 15-219 to -220 n.23, as well as the holding in Mauldin, clearly shows
that South Carolina has not accepted the discovery rule in workers' compensation cases
that involve claims other than occupational diseases.
71. 301 S.C. 519, 392 S.E.2d 804 (Ct. App.), af/'d per curiam, 397 S.E.2d 377 (S.C.
1990) (adopting court of appeals opinion).
72. The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law is codified at S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 42-1-10 to -19-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990).
73. Holley, 301 S.C. at 521, 392 S.E.2d at 805; e.g., Kearse v. South Carolina Wild-
life Resources Dep't, 236 S.C. 540, 544, 115 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1960).
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Wilton Holley's job as a hot repairman required him to climb to
the top of a tall ladder to remove slag14 from the top of a furnace.
Temperatures along the ladder reached 120 degrees fahrenheit.75 On
the day of his death, Holley climbed to the top of the ladder and
cleaned the top of the furnace. After he descended, Holley told his su-
pervisor, "[S]omething happened to me."176 Moments later, he had dif-
ficulty breathing. He pounded his chest and collapsed. An ambulance
transported Holley to a hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.7
Holley's widow instituted a claim for workers' compensation death
benefits. The Workers' Compensation Commissioner found that the ex-
treme heat caused by the furnace and the climb on the day of death
contributed to, accelerated, or aggravated a pre-existing heart condi-
tion and thereby caused Holley's heart attack and subsequent death.
The Commissioner held that the exposure to the heat and the strenu-
ous climbing required by Holley's job constituted unusual and ex-
traordinary conditions and awarded Holley's widow death benefits
based upon the traditional heart attack rule. The full commission and
the circuit court affirmed the order.78
The court of appeals also affirmed, but on different grounds. The
court of appeals held that a heart attack caused by excessive tempera-
ture is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law even if the
excessive temperature is a normal incident of the employment.79
The court's rationale for its decision was fourfold. First, the court
noted the "wide latitude" given to the extreme heat rule in workers'
compensation cases in South Carolina. 0 The rule already included in-
juries similar to heart attacks, such as heat stroke, heat exhaustion,
and sun stroke.8' Because of this wide latitude and the similarity of the
injuries already compensable under the rule, the extension to include
heat-induced heart attacks was logical. Second, the court found highly
74. "[F]used and vitrified matter separated during the reduction of a metal from its
ore." TE RANDOM HOUSE DIcTroNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1338 (6th ed. 1973).
75. Holley's fellow employees testified that the temperature was so hot that it would
take a person's breath away. Holley, 301 S.C. at 520, 392 S.E.2d at 805.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 521, 392 S.E.2d at 805.
79. Id. at 523-24, 392 S.E.2d at 807.
80. Id. at 521, 392 S.E.2d at 806. The court quoted from Smith v. Southern Build-
ers, 202 S.C. 88, 24 S.E.2d 109 (1943), to illustrate this point. "'[H]eat prostration which
results from the employee's engaging in the employment, whether due to unusual or
extraordinary condition or not, is to be deemed an accidental injury within the mean-
ing of the statutes." Holley, 301 S.C. at 521-22, 392 S.E.2d at 806 (emphasis added by
court) (quoting Smith, 202 S.C. at 101, 24 S.E.2d at 115).
81. Holley, 301 S.C. at 521, 392 S.E.2d at 806.
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persuasive the North Carolina Supreme Court's adoption of th same
type of exception to the traditional heart attack rule.8 2 The Holly
court's holding made South Carolina's application of the excessive heat
rule to heart attacks consistent with interpretations of North Caro-
lina's act, upon which South Carolina modeled its act. 3 Third, the
court observed that its holding was "consistent with the developing law
on this subject."'" Finally, the court noted that when it must construe
an unclear section of the Workers' Compensation Law, any reasonable
doubt as to the construction of the Law should be resolved in favor of
providing coverage rather than noncoverage.85
The question left open by the Holley court is what standard ap-
plies in heart attack cases to determine whether a condition of employ-
ment is unusual and extraordinary. Both sides in Holley argued the
traditional heart attack rule. Holley's widow argued that the heat from
the furnace was an unusual and extraordinary condition." Holley's em-
ployer, on the other hand, argued that the exposure to the heat was
neither unusual nor extraordinary because it was part of Honey's nor-
mal employment.87 Holley's employer argued that the unusualness of a
condition had to be judged relative to the normal duties required of
the job. The court avoided resolving this key issue by creating an ex-
ception to the traditional heart attack rule. Thus, the court had left
open the question of whether unusual and extraordinary conditions in
82. Id. at 522, 392 S.E.2d at 806 (citing Dillingham v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 320 N.C.
499, 358 S.E.2d 380 (1987)).
83. The Holley court noted that "[t]he South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act
was tailored after the North Carolina Act and opinions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court construing such Act are entitled to great weight with the appellate courts of this
state." Id. at 523, 392 S.E.2d at 806 (citing Carter v. Penny Tire & Recapping Co., 261
S.C. 341, 200 S.E.2d 64 (1973)).
84. Id. at 524 n.2, 392 S.E.2d at 807 n.2 (citing lB A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 38.40, .50, .64 (1987 & Supp. 1989)). Interestingly, section 38.40
indicates that frostbite and sunstroke are accidental injuries when caused by usual con-
ditions of employment, but mentions nothing about heart attacks. 1B A. LARSON, supra,
§ 38.40. Likewise, section 38.50 mentions nothing about heart attacks in usual exposure
or exertion cases. Id. § 38.50. Section 38.64, however, does discuss heart attack cases. Id.
§ 38.64. In the past New York and New Jersey both required satisfaction of an unusual-
ness test in heart attack cases similar to that required in South Carolina before Holley.
Id, Larson traces the erosion of this requirement in both states and notes that nearly-all
on-the-job heart attacks are compensable. Id.
New York holds that an event is sufficiently unusual if it is unusual in relation to
any of the following: "(1) the employee's own usual work; (2) the 'wear and tear' of ordi-
nary nonemployment life; or (3) the usual work of other employees." Id. § 38.64(a)(7).
Section 38.64 also contains a discussion of New York cases involving heart attacks
caused by climbing on the job, id. § 38.64(a)(6), but the Holley court did not refer to it.
85. Holley, 301 S.C. at 524, 392 S.E.2d at 807.
86. Record at 3.
87. Holley, 301 S.C. at 521 n.1, 392 S.E.2d at 805 n.1.
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heart acack cases were to be judged in reference to the typical duties
and functions of the claimant's job, the typical duties and functions of
a normal job, or according to some absolute scale.8
In DeBruhl v. Kershaw County Sheriff's Departments" the court
of appeals resolved this ambiguity. The sheriff of Kershaw County suf-
fered a heart attack soon after reporting to a late night crime scene.
The Workers' Compensation Commission denied benefits, but the cir-
cuit court reversed. The circuit court noted that the sheriff had worked
twenty hours that day, and the crime being investigated involved the
death of a friend. The circuit court decided that these factors would
constitute an unusual strain on any individual.90
The court of appeals reversed. The court stated that conditions of
employment causing heart attacks must be unusual or extraordinary
relative to the ordinary exertion required in the performance of the
claimant's job.91 Because the conditions of employment contributing to
the heart attack in question were not "unusual or unexpected for the
Sheriff of Kershaw County,"' 2 the court held that the heart attack was
not compensable.
DeBruhl also underscores the significance of Holley. The excep-
tion to th. traditional heart attack rule adopted in Holley allows for
benefits to be awarded even if the excessive heat causing the heart at-
tack is a normal part of the claimant's job. Those suffering heat-in-
duced heart attacks in the course of employment confront a reduced
burden for receiving workers' compensation benefits, whereas claim-
ants that suffer exertion-related heart attacks must show extraordinary
conditions.
Robert F. Daley, Jr.
88. Prior to Holley South Carolina courts recognized various conditions in heart
cases as unusual and extraordinary working conditions. Courts have held that unusually
long work schedules, extreme time pressures, and great physical exertion meet this stan-
dard. See, e.g., McWhorter v. South Carolina Dep't of Ins., 252 S.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 365
(1969) (per curiam) (heart attack held compensable when immediately prior to attack
the claimant had been working unusually long hours and laboring under extreme emo-
tional pressure); Wynn v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 238 S.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 812 (1961)
(heart attack held compensable when prior to the attack claimant had been required to
increase his work schedule from eight and one-half to sixteen hours per day); Poulos v.
Pete's Drive-In No. 3, 284 S.C. 264, 325 S.E.2d 583 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 286 S.C. 128,
032 S.E.2d 529 (1985) (heart attack held compensable when prior to attack claimant had
been assigned additional duties requiring him to work longer hours). The method used
by these courts in determining that the conditions were unusual, however, is not entirely
clear.
89. 397 S.E.2d 782 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
90. Id. at 784-85.
91. Id. at 785-86.
92. Id. at 786.
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